Review of Inrostopt shipments to North Korea
A review of Inrostopt LLC export operations from 2022 to 2024 identified volumes above the UN cap, payments through UAE companies, and petroleum shipments to two recipients in North Korea.
Case overview
- Category
- Sanctions risk review
- Subject
- Inrostopt LLC, tax ID 2538114016
- Review period
- 2022–2024
- Jurisdictions
- Russia · UAE · North Korea
Context
Inrostopt LLC is registered in Vladivostok and exported petrol, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum gas from 2022 to 2024. Customs declarations identified North Korea as the final destination. UssuriNefteprodukt LLC, tax ID 2511044682, supplied the raw materials.
Bondar N. V. was identified as the founder and de facto manager of Inrostopt. Bondar A. A. acted as director and customs declarant. Directorship was transferred within the family shortly before the active shipment period.
Objective
Compare the goods and payment flows, assess shipment volumes against UN Security Council Resolution 2397, and identify the companies, banks, individuals, and logistics infrastructure supporting the operations between Russia, the UAE, and North Korea.
Goods and payment routes
Goods moved from Russia to North Korea. Payments travelled in the opposite direction through Esgravity General Trading FZCO and Amax General Trading FZCO in the UAE, a Russian bank, and finally to Inrostopt LLC. The mismatch between the goods and payment routes obscured the final payer in a standard review.
How the review was conducted
Comparison of customs declarations and bank statements
Review of companies, directors, and beneficial owners in Russia and the UAE
Analysis of payments in roubles, US dollars, euros, and yuan
Review of the Russia–North Korea rail route
Data sources
Participants in the operations
The chain included UssuriNefteprodukt LLC, Inrostopt LLC, Promselkhozbank, Esgravity General Trading FZCO, and Amax General Trading FZCO. The North Korean recipients were Ka Thae JV and Won Bok FTC. The documented transaction volumes were approximately USD 5.6 million and USD 0.6 million respectively.
Payments through Esgravity exceeded RUB 200 million, while Amax processed RUB 94 million. The ultimate beneficial owners of both UAE companies could not be established.
What the review established
Inrostopt shipments exceeded the annual cap of 500,000 barrels established by UN Security Council Resolution 2397 within six months.
The shipments included petrol, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum gas. Some of these categories are directly restricted or prohibited by the resolution.
Esgravity and Amax were registered in the UAE shortly before the transactions, used Russian digital infrastructure, and did not disclose verifiable ultimate beneficial owners.
Shipments passed through a rail terminal serving the Russia–North Korea border crossing. A national rail operator handled the freight under a long-term contract with Inrostopt LLC.
The combined routes, payments, management structure, and unidentified beneficial owners formed a consistent picture of potential sanctions circumvention.
Review outcome
The report connected specific declarations, payments, companies, directors, and recipients into a single structure. The recommended next steps were to establish the beneficial owners of the UAE companies, separately review Promselkhozbank contract No. C-1112, and examine the biographies and links of A. A. and N. V. Bondar to the bankrupt energy group.